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Over the past six years, Malibu Media, LLC, (Malibu) producer and
distributor of hardcore pornographic films through its website Xart.com,
has filed thousands of copyright infringement suits against ‘swarms’ of
John Does for using a BitTorrent file-sharing protocol to allegedly and
without license download and view their products.1 Malibu’s strategy has
been to use court subpoena authority to identify large numbers of
heretofore anonymous internet subscribers and then threaten them
individually with copyright infringement claims that would prospectively
result in fines and public embarrassment unless they agreed to an offered
private settlement.2 While most illegal downloading by file sharing has
involved noncontroversial fare, such as mainstream movies, vintage

* Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown. The author wishes to
acknowledge the helpful guidance and suggestions of H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, Douglas Hay, Henry
Mares, Simon Stern, and the research assistance of Rhiannon Markless.
1. As reported by Matthew Sag, Malibu filed over 1,700 copyright suits against over 6,000 John
Doe defendants related to pornography between 2012 and the first quarter of 2014. The second most
prolific plaintiff was Patrick Collins, Inc., with over 200 suits filed between 2001 and 2014 against over
11,000 John Does. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1005,
1131–1132 tbls.1 & 2 (2015). In the three years since January 1, 2014, Malibu filed suits against 5,975
individual John Does, predominantly in the second (1,126), seventh (995), fourth (991), and sixth (883)
circuits. See generally Justia Dockets & Filings, https://dockets.justia.com (last visited January 16,
2017).
2. See Luke Curran, Copyright Trolls, Defining the Line Between Legal Ransom Letters and
Defending Digital Rights: Turning Piracy into a Business Model or Protecting Creative from Internet
Lawlessness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 170, 194 (2013).
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television series, anime, and sports,3 the extortive element of the Malibu
strategy has proven most effective against downloaders of pornographic
material.
Largely unnoticed in the proliferation of these types of copyright
infringement suits have been some faint echoes of the vintage content
exceptionalism argument from common law holding that irrespective of
legislative actions or intent, courts should not on public policy grounds
provide equitable relief to owners of illicit and immoral materials which
assumedly might incentivize their proliferation and harmful effects.4
Historically the doctrine of concept exceptionalism developed in response
to the absence of restrictive language on content in copyright statutes in
both England and America, leaving equitable jurisdiction in limbo and
leaving it to juries to sort out and punish the publication and distribution of
criminally-harmful materials on a case-by-case basis.5
Traditionally, content exceptions in copyright have in common law
been reserved for illegal materials, following the maxim that equitable
protection should not be granted to plaintiffs who have in regard to the
particulars of the claim behaved in an inequitable manner toward the
defendants or the public at large, the latter most specifically with respect to
criminal behavior.6 If copyright statutes did not delineate content-based
exceptions to be parsed by a designated registrar or the courts, the
provision of copyright protections fell to juries to determine the legality of
the production or distribution (publication) of the works at issue, subject to
other constitutional protections. While the proliferation of works of ‘illicit
content’ in the marketplace has always spawned demands for statutory
exceptions, the prevailing view has been and remains that any such
3. See David Price, Sizing the Piracy Universe, NETNAMES (September 2013),
https://www.netnames.com/assets/shared/whitepaper/pdf/netnames-sizing-piracy-universe-FULLreportsept2013.pdf (last visited October 22, 2016) (estimating that pornographic material comprises less than
a third of all torrent downloading traffic, with 76% of the pornographic traffic non-copyright
infringing).
4. Often referred to as consequentialism, this argument is a reflection of the common law
‘natural tendency’ test, whereby juries would consider a publication’s ‘reasonable consequence’ to do
public harm, independent of actual evidence of ill-consequence or of the publisher’s benevolent intent.
See James R. Alexander, Roth at Fifty: Reconsidering the Common Law Antecedents of American
Obscenity Doctrine, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 419–423 (2008); Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and
Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 38 (2012) (arguing the social harm caused by distribution and
consumption of pornography provides a constitutional rationale for denying them copyright protection
as they cannot be construed to promote progress or the useful arts); Ned Snow, Content-Based
Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L. J. 1473, 1514 (2015) (arguing that the Copyright clause mandate of
promoting the progress of science excludes obscene materials which have little to no social value and
provides a legitimate basis for denial of copyright protection in the courts).
5. See generally James R. Alexander, Evil Angel Eulogy: Reflections on the Passing of the
Obscenity Defense in Copyright, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 209 (2013).
6. Id. at 219–242 (tracing the maxim regarding inequitable behavior in English common law).
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restrictions on expressive content would invite strict scrutiny of legislative
purpose under the First Amendment.7 This position has been recently
reinforced in Matal v. Tam, that as a content-based statutory exception, the
disparagement portion of Section 2(a) of the U.S. Trademark Act was
subject to strict scrutiny and held to be unconstitutional.8
Since the eighteenth century, both law and equity courts accepted
what became known as the obscenity defense in cases of copyright
infringement, an affirmative defense in which plaintiffs claiming copyright
infringement on their works were argued to be ineligible for protection if
their works were of such a nature as to harm the public. If so, the plaintiff
was considered to be approaching the court with “unclean hands,” in effect
asking the court to support their illicit behavior.9 This defense, grounded in
the common law acceptance of content exceptionalism, can be traced back
to a series of early nineteenth century English rulings at equity by Lord
Chancellor Eldon that were considered governing in American law through
the late 1970s, when definitively challenged by Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v.
Cinema Adult Theater.10 The ruling in Mitchell Bros. established the now

7. See, e.g., Eldar Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16 YALE
J. L. & TEC. 454, 480–484 (2014) (arguing that the Copyright clause itself mandates or at least opines
for content discrimination but to build that into statutory language must navigate the shoals of strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment).
8. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017), affirming In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1346–
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The Federal Circuit, in discussing parallels between trademark and
copyright protections, adding “denying benefits of copyright registration to disfavored speech . . . is
anathema to the First Amendment” and cautioned that considering trademark registration as
government speech, thereby eliminating all First Amendment protections, could have as easily be used
to deny such protections under copyright registration. The Federal Circuit’s ruling, however, presumed
a distinction could be drawn between expressive and commercial elements of trademark protection,
with the former subject to First Amendment protections, a distinction that had been challenged by Ned
Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B. C. L. REV. 1639, 1668 n.173 (2016) (arguing
that the Commerce and Copyright clauses provide entirely different bases for considering content
discrimination); Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and
Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 422 (2016) (agreeing that copyright and trademark laws
provide different types of protections, but specifying that copyright protects the expression in a work
and “to mandate that the work be nondisparaging or nonobscene to get protection is to mandate a
change in the work itself as a condition of the benefits of protection.”). In Matal, the Court argued that
Tam’s trademark contained expressive content and, even if viewed only as commercial speech, the
disparagement clause still could not withstand the relaxed scrutiny standard established under Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) since the substantial
government interest involved was in preventing speech that expressed ideas that offend. See Matal, 137
S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
9. Alexander, supra note 5, at 242–58.
10. See, e.g., 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (enforcing the
copyright on a pornographic film conceded to be obscene) [hereinafter Mitchell Bros.]; see also Jartech,
Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (arguing that the
uniform application of copyright protection would be fragmented by differential applications based on
community standards) [hereinafter Jartech]; Nova Prods. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 03-Civ.4259, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24171 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Nova Prods.]; Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v.
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commonly-accepted principle of content neutrality in copyright protection
that, unless constitutionally acceptable content exceptions were specified,
all expressive content was eligible for copyright protection if all other
statutory requirements, such as authorship, originality, and registration
were fulfilled.11
The purpose of this paper is to lend a more careful ear to those echoes
to see if the recent swarm of cases offer new insights regarding the
common law argument for content exceptionalism, or are simply restating
the basic concerns expressed when the common law acceptance of content
exceptionalism was first challenged, not in Mitchell Bros. in 1979 but
rather in those earlier rulings of Lord Eldon, beginning in 1802 with Walcot
v. Walker with which the establishment of the principle has long been
associated.12 While such an investigation may seem antiquated and arcane,
what we discover is that those rulings wrestled with all of the same issues
we consider germane today and perhaps with more circumspection than we
might have believed. Their reexamination may in fact inform our
interpretation of these most recent echoes.
I.

ECHOES IN RECENT SWARM CASES: NEXT PHASE AND ITS
PROGENY

Malibu and other producers of pornographic movies filed ‘swarm’
suits against multiple and unnamed John Doe defendants identified only by
their subscriber account numbers with their respective internet service
providers (ISPs), joining them—often numbering in the hundreds or
thousands—in a single suit for court expediency.13 In each, plaintiffs

PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2009) [hereinafter Dream Games]; Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter,
689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Flava Works].
11. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, §
315, at 39 (Third Ed., Dec. 22, 2014), excepting possible content review when a work contains material
that appears to fall within the scope of the Child Protection Act. See Alexander, supra note 5, 304–314
(describing the impact of Mitchell Bros. on subsequent court rulings). That the principle of content
neutrality is largely accepted rather than wholly accepted is the subject of this paper.
12. See generally Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch) (holding that establishment of
rightful property at law must precede an equitable claim of copyright protection of materials of
questionable content) [hereinafter Walcot]. Eldon’s ruling in Walcot followed dictum by Eyre, C.J., in
Dr. Priestley’s Case (1791) (CPD, nisi prius), that there can be no property in a work that in its nature
is calculated to do injury to the public. Priestley was first reported arguendo in Southey v. Sherwood
(1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008 (Ch) [hereinafter Southey] and in detail by Abbott, C.J., in Stockdale v.
Onwhyn (1826) 172 Eng. Rep. 75, 76, n.(b) (KB, nisi prius). The plaintiff in the 1802 case was John
Wolcot (1736–1819), whose name was misspelled in the original published nominate report of Eldon’s
ruling and continuously thereafter.
13. See Stefan Mentzer & Michael La Marca, Joinder and Early Discovery in BitTorrent
Copyright Infringement Suits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 89, 91–93 (2015) (describing the legal
standard for joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20); Sag, Copyright Trolling, supra note 1,
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petitioned for subpoena authority under expedited discovery to require the
non-party ISPs to divulge the identities of those subscribers allegedly using
BitTorrent software programs to illegally download copyrighted movies.14
The plaintiff then had to not only prove ownership of a valid copyright for
films that had been downloaded without license but also document actual
copying of elements of an original work in order to establish a prima facie
claim sufficient to warrant expedited discovery.15
Rulings in these cases followed a fairly consistent pattern. In virtually
all cases, the plaintiff’s claim to a valid copyright, based on a film’s
registration, was accepted as sufficient to consider expedited discovery. 16
Plaintiff’s counsel then petitioned to join large numbers of claims against
anonymous John Doe infringers to facilitate subpoenaing third-party ISPs
to gain the identities of their account users who could be tagged with the
downloading. The Court then had to consider whether it was appropriate
for large numbers of unnamed defendants to be joined in a single claim,
and in particular whether all of the John Does identified in the allegedly
infringing swarm had actually colluded to download recognizable elements
of the copyrighted materials in a single action. This proved to be a rocky
road as even with advanced tracking software, as it was difficult for
plaintiffs to demonstrate that defendants had actually acted in concert in a
single transaction.17
Moreover, the participation of any one John Doe in a swarm over any
time period did not indicate he was an active participant at all times, or
even during the times that the elements of the film were downloaded.
Instead, it was more likely that the John Does participated at different times
on different days. And given the pervasiveness of wireless routers, a single
IP address might support multiple computer devices, allowing others not
listed on the ISP address to access the swarm and illegally download the
1131–1132 (identifying the pattern of multi-defendant John Doe litigation as a business model and
documenting its principal practitioners in the pornographic film industry).
14. See Charles F. Prutzman, Jr., Joinder and the Internet: Understanding the Intricacies of
BitTorrent and the Fair Resolution of Copyright Infringement Cases, 32 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL.
L. 185, 190–201 (2013) (outlining the use of the BitTorrent interface and the complications it raises for
justifying joinder).
15. See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (identifying the
doctrinal requisites for a prima facie claim of copyright infringement).
16. Since the Court first recognized copyright ownership in pornographic films in Mitchell Bros.,
604 F.2d at 854, producers have routinely copyrighted each film, only later discovering the difficulty
and high cost of enforcing them. See Kate Darling, IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult
Entertainment Industry, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 709 (2014) (finding the industry has greater
economic incentive to diversify its services toward consumption convenience and interactive products
than to protect its copyrighted monopoly of traditional content).
17. See generally Mentzer & La Marca, supra note 13, at 94–107 (reviewing how district courts
have arrived at conflicting rulings on the appropriateness of joinder in swarm cases).
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movies in question. Furthermore, joinder of multiple John Doe defendants
might compromise the ability of the Court to weigh their individual and
perhaps unique defense arguments fairly.
Finally, many courts recoiled at what has been portrayed as the film
production companies’ new ‘business model,’ under which they sought
subpoena power to gain the identities for large numbers of ISP subscribers
with no intention of proceeding to litigation.18 Instead, a company
contacted subscribers directly, threatening them with individual (and
public) infringement suits that would prove expensive to defend and even
more expensive if lost, not to mention the public embarrassment of
exposure as having downloaded pornographic films.19 Subscribers were
then offered settlement for nominal amounts through an internet portal, a
scheme often portrayed as court-assisted extortion, and if accepted, the
plaintiff would voluntarily drop the threatened suit.20
The most cited among recent swarm cases has been Next Phase Dist.
Co., Inc., v. John Does 1–2721 which granted discovery against John Doe 1

18. See, e.g., AF Holdings, LLC v. John Does 1–1058, 752 F.3d 990, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(holding as bad faith the abuses of discretion practiced by Prenda Law, a notorious copyright troll,
regarding its petitions for both jurisdiction and joinder). Many courts have described this business
model with disdain without concluding that the plaintiff was engaging in inequitable conduct under the
“clean hands” doctrine. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 16-CV-01068-AWI-SKO, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147883, at *11 (E.D. Calif. Oct. 25, 2016) (“Despite these concerns, most district
courts have permitted Plaintiff to serve ISPs with third-party subpoenas to discover the identity of the
customer associated with the relevant IP Address.”). On occasion, a defendant has unsuccessfully
alleged an abuse of process in that the plaintiff’s offer to settle was demonstrative of having no
intention to litigate the claim but instead wanting only to use the Court’s subpoena authority just to
leverage the ISP for the John Does’ names and addresses in order to send them extortion letters, which
the Court ruled was not conduct under an unclean hands defense. See, e.g., Purzel Video GmbH v.
Smoak, No. 13-CV-001167-WYD-MEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182586, at *9 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2013)
(accepting that “[o]ther courts addressing similar abuse of process claims have found that attempting
settlement does not support a claim for abuse of process regardless of the parties’ motivations.”).
However, the affirmative defense of “unclean hands’ has been seriously considered when the Plaintiff is
alleged to have colluded with the ISP to encourage infringement. See, e.g., Grady v. Iacullo, No. 13CV-00624-RM-KMT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50846, at *10 (D. Colo. Feb. 29, 2016) (instead of
working with the third-party website to block infringing activity, the Plaintiff instead continues to bring
suits against rampant infringement activities by individual users).
19. One of the most active production companies using this model has been Malibu Media, whose
tactics are described in most court rulings. See, e.g., Malibu Media LLC v. John Doe, No. 15 CIV.
4369, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015); see also, Sag, supra note 1, at
1129–1133 (identifying Malibu’s instigation of 1,709 suits filed against John Does from 2001 to 2014,
over seven times as many as the next most active plaintiff Patrick Collins, Inc.).
20. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15-CV-13124, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69290,
at *2, n.1 (E.D. Mich. S.D. May 27, 2016) (citing 289 of 290 cases filed in that district against one of
more John Does between June 2012 and September 2015, of which 287 were closed, mostly voluntary
dismissed by Malibu having successfully gained subpoena authority to acquire subscriber
identifications).
21. Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. John Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter
Next Phase]. In the five-year period since Next Phase (through Oct. 25, 2016), it has been cited in over
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but severed John Does 2-27 because of the weakness of the collusion claim.
And yet, while the court accepted the plaintiff’s copyright registration as
sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a prima facie case of infringement
for expedited discovery,22 it added what has become a bellwether, if only as
an infrequent echo, of traditional content exceptionalism:
[I]f the Motion Picture is considered obscene, it may not be
eligible for copyright protection[.] [T]he case law is
unsettled regarding whether pornography may legitimately
be copyrighted, . . . [and that] since the Mitchell Bros.
decision, judges across the country and within this district
have reached different conclusions on this issue.23
This same phraseology has appeared in a number of subsequent cases
in which valid registration had been accepted, either quoted from Next
Phase or directly referencing a footnote in Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v.
Swarm Sharing Hash File and John Does 1-3824 that had stated it was
“unsettled in many circuits, whether pornography is in fact entitled to
protection against copyright infringements.”25
That footnote in Liberty Media recalled all of the issues nominally
resolved by Mitchell Bros. and became the principal echo of its
consequentialist critique. It recognized that copyright protection was
“effectively unavailable for pornography” until “the landmark decision” of
Mitchell Bros.,26 that even if a film were deemed obscene it could
nonetheless not be denied protection under a valid copyright, and the
question of whether a pornographic film were obscene was to be
determined by a jury.27 Moreover, the Court accepted that plaintiff Liberty
ninety district court cases, most confining its reference to issues regarding the properness of joinder of
multiple unnamed John Doe defendants.
22. Id. at 171 n.5, following In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296
F.R.D. 80, 87 n.8 (E.D.N.Y.) (“For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that plaintiff’s works are
entitled to copyright protection, though that may be an open question.”) [hereinafter In re: BitTorrent].
23. Id. at 171. The Court apparently offered this line of argument without provocation, since no
defense counsel was listed to argue it substantively, and its generalization about the views of other
judges on the issue of content exceptionalism was offered without documentation.
24. 821 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D. Mass. 2011) [hereinafter Liberty Media].
25. Id. at 447 n.2.
26. Id.; see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982).
27. Liberty Media, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 447 n.2. District courts have indiscriminately referred to
films in these cases as erotic, pornographic, or obscene, making their rulings, if based on content,
confusing. It is commonly recognized that erotic films are those involving sexual themes and/or images
of varying degrees of explicitness from implied to graphic. Pornographic films are intended to elicit a
lascivious response from certain categories of viewers based on their sexual preferences, more a
consideration of producer intent and how the product is marketed than evidence of audience receptivity.
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Mutual was a distributor of hardcore but lawful pornography28 and had a
valid copyright to the film allegedly downloaded illegally.29 While the
Court averred in a footnote that the issue of copyright protection for
pornography had not yet been addressed by that (the First) Circuit and was
“unsettled in many circuits,” it stipulated that issue was not before it and
expressed no opinion on it.30
Ostensibly to illustrate the unsettled nature of the issue, the Liberty
Media footnote invited a comparison of two rulings from the Second
Circuit. The first was Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video,31 in which the
Court denied an order to show cause, to seize of defendant’s unlicensed
copies, and to provide injunctive relief because, having viewed three of the
over two hundred films allegedly copied, concluded they were obscene.32 It
then declared that “given the clearly criminal nature of the plaintiff’s

So-called hard-core pornographic films are explicitly graphic, but still mostly within “the usual limits of
candor” by local standards in some communities and not illegal. That a film is obscene is not merely
(and subjectively) content descriptive but rather a legal finding that a jury has held it to be criminal in
effecting or imminently threatening social harm, under the three-pronged standard promulgated in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973). See generally Richard Posner, SEX AND REASON
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) (distinguishing erotic, pornographic and obscene works in
historical context).
28. Liberty Media, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 447 n.2. Most of the films allegedly downloaded illegally in
these swarm cases have been conceded by all parties to be pornographic and none has been found
criminally obscene by a jury. To argue that a film is ineligible for copyright protection because it is
pornographic is to apply a content-based standard to expressive works not called for by copyright
statutes and prohibitive under strict scrutiny. The only exception to this may be works containing child
pornography, unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2006) and which, if held to disqualify a registered but
not criminal work from copyright protection, might constitute a content limitation on copyright. See
generally Carissa B. Hessick, The Limits of Child Pornography, 89 IND. L. J. 1437 (2014). To date,
however, no court within the scope of this study has directly ruled on that argument, some leaving the
issue “for another day.” See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 13-C-3648, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77929, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2014), while other courts have followed the “prevailing view”
that obscene and immoral content is copyrightable. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Zumbo, No. 2:13CV-729-JES-DNF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82272, at *11–12 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2014) (citing Dream
Games, 561 F.3d at 991); Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. V. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861 (5th
Cir. 1979) (holding “that even obscenity and immoral content is copyrightable.”). While content
distinctions raised by child pornography laws continue to be argued, the issue remains largely
hypothetical regarding registered works against which criminal action has not been taken as “it seems
unlikely that unambiguous works of child pornography in which real children are depicted have even
been registered with the copyright office.” Bartow, supra note 4, at 40.
29. Liberty Media, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
30. Id. at 447 n.2 (“This issue . . . is not presently before the Court and the Court expresses no
opinion on it here.”).
31. 29 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Devils Films].
32. Id. at 175 (stating that “they are hard core pornography bereft of any plot and with very little
dialogue.”) This was based on the Supreme Court’s presumptive knowledge of its own community
standards in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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operation, it is self-evident that the Court should not use its equitable power
to come to the plaintiff’s assistance,”33 continuing:
Since this is only an application for preliminary relief, the Court need
not decide if obscenity is a defense to a claim of copyright
violation . . . . It is far from clear that the Second Circuit will follow
the Fifth [Mitchell Bros.] and Ninth [Jartech] Circuits in rejecting the
argument that obscene material is entitled to copyright protection . . .
[an argument outweighed by] the potential ramifications of ordering
the U.S. marshal to aid in the violation of federal and state law. It
strains credulity that Congress intended to extend the protection of the
copyright law to contraband.34
While Devils Films has been cited in a few copyright infringement
cases as effectively countering Mitchell Bros., its precedent value is far
from clear.35 Without stipulating whether or not the plaintiff had valid
copyrights to the films, the Court in Devils Films denied relief because in
its view the films at issue were obscene and implicitly ‘clearly criminal.’ 36
In doing so, it exhibited exactly the kind of anti-democratic and arbitrary
paternalism (as moral censor) of which Lord Eldon was accused in the
early nineteenth century. The Court then noted that it did not need to
address the issue of whether the obscene nature of a film denied it
copyright protection (albeit having just done so) and that its own Circuit
had not yet considered whether it might accept the same reasoning as
33. Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175. The Court further stipulated that plaintiff’s videos were
produced in California and sold in New York, indicating that “probable cause exists to believe that the
plaintiff is violating 18 U.S.C. § 1466,” making it illegal to sell or transfer obscene materials interstate.
34. Id. at 176. As Mitchell Bros. had traced the statutory history of copyright exceptionalism and
demonstrated a clear congressional intent to avoid such narrowing stipulations, the Court in Devils
Films seemed more to lament congressional inaction than to take issue with the Mitchell Bros.
interpretation of the congressional record. The presumption of content neutrality in copyright protection
has caused the Supreme Court to rely on the statutory record to reveal congressional intent. See Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (deferring to Congress as to “how best to pursue the Copyright
Clause’s objectives”); see also Margot Kaminksi, Copyright Crime and Punishment: The First
Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 606–08 (2014) (discussing Eldred, 537
U.S. 186).
35. It has in fact been cited in only five rulings: Liberty Media Holdings v. Swarm Sharing Hash
File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D. Mass. 2011); Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. John Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Nova Prods. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 03-Civ. 4259, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-28, No. 12-CV-12598, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 189311 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–33, No. 4:12-CV13309, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50674 (E.D. Mich. February 27, 2013), none of which accepted the
premise of Devils Films that obscene materials were beyond copyright eligibility.
36. Here it is ambiguous whether the attribution of criminality is to the films themselves or to the
business operation of Devils Films, which distributed the films in interstate commerce.
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Mitchell Bros. and subsequent cases regarding the content neutrality of
copyright protection.37
The other Second Circuit ruling cited by a footnote in Liberty Media,
and the only one directly addressing the question of content
exceptionalism, in fact supported Mitchell Bros. In Nova Prods. Inc. v.
Kisma Video, Inc.,38 the principal defendant relied on the declaration of one
of the other named individual defendants that the videos at issue were “all
‘hard-core’ pornographic films” and argued they did not warrant copyright
protection, citing Devils Films.39 However, the Court found that declaration
insufficient to categorize the entire catalog of films as obscene, especially
without reference to a relevant and evolving community standard under
Miller, and denied summary judgment.40
The Nova Court ruled that while it reached no decision on the question
of whether the films were obscene, any such factual determination would
not affect their eligibility for copyright protection since obscenity was not
an accepted affirmative defense for copyright infringement.41 And while
Devils Films had felt comfortable in declaring films obscene, Nova was
clear that such a determination was a matter for a jury, especially
considering that courts in that circuit had previously found other ‘hardcore’ pornographic materials to be insufficiently ‘patently-offensive’ to be
considered obscene.42
II.

THE ASSERTION OF DIVERGENCE AMONG THE DISTRICT
COURTS

So, the assertion in Next Phase that “judges all across the country and
in this District have reached different conclusions” on the copyrightability
of obscene matter clearly warrants closer scrutiny. In the five years since
37. Up to that point, the Second Circuit had not considered the issue at all, and it can be argued it
has not since.
38. Nova Prods., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171. This case represents a consolidation of four
cases involving Nova/Devils Films: Devils Films, Inc. v. Kisma Video, 02 Civ. 6277; Nova Products v.
Kisma Video, 02 Civ. 3850; Nova Products v. 610 Video, 03 Civ. 3379; and West Coast, Inc. v. 557
Video, Inc. 03 Civ. 4259.
39. Nova Prods., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7.
40. Id. at *8–10. This is an example of indiscriminate classifications of film based on content.
That a film is pornographic (even hard-core pornographic) does not render it legally obscene, and to
argue that “hard-core pornographic films’ are ineligible for copyright protection is to apply a commonlaw exceptionalism not found in copyright statutes. See discussion, supra note 28.
41. Id. at *10, *12–13 (citing Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1979) and Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982) as the only two court of
appeals’ decisions to consider the issue).
42. Id. at *12 (citing U.S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch., 565 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), aff’d, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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Liberty Media, the Second Circuit has addressed infringement on
copyrighted pornographic films in 17 cases: 6 against multiple John Does
during 2012–13,43 and 11 against individual John Does, mostly in the two
years (2015–16).44 All were ‘swarm’ file-sharing cases, characterized by
one judge as “well-worn territory for Malibu [Media] and similar plaintiffs
alleging copyright infringement of erotic movies by John Doe
defendants.”45 In all but four, the plaintiff was ruled to have established a
sufficient copyright for a prima facie claim for expedited discovery without
mentioning whether copyright protection might be compromised by the
content of the films. In the other four, the Second Circuit likewise accepted
the plaintiffs’ copyright registration but averred in some manner to the
prospect that eligibility for copyright protection, based on questionable
content, might still be an open question.46
In other districts, the rulings in swarm copyright infringement cases
followed similar patterns. Among the plaintiffs, Malibu Media has almost
single-handedly swamped the district courts with multiple or individual

43. See Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. John Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. John Does 1–44, No. 12 Civ. 1568, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118232 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 21, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–5, 285 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Media Prods.
v. John Does 1–26, 12 Civ. 3719, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125366 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. v. John Does 1–24, 12 Civ. 4231, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36359 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013);
Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–11, 12 Civ. 3810, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99332 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
2013).
44. See Pearson Educ. Inc. v. John Doe, No. 12 Civ. 4786, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146721
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Doe, 288 F.R.D. 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Patrick
Collins, Inc. v. John Doe, 945 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No.
14-CV-8903, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177954 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John
Doe, No. 15-CV-1883, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51579 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v.
John Doe, No. 15-CV-1883, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76608 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015); Malibu Media,
LLC v. John Doe, No. 1:16-CV-01068-AWI-SKO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147883 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
2016); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15 Civ. 4743, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108932 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15 Civ. 4381, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108934
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 1:16-CV-02462-AJN, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64656 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2016); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15-CV-3504, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 112187 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016).
45. Malibu Media, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108934, at *2 (The Court in this instance ignored
the issue of content altogether by simply referring to the films as erotic rather than pornographic or
obscene).
46. See In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 87 n.8
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Liberty Media Holdings v. Swarm Sharing Hash File and John Does 1–38, 821
F. Supp. 2d 244 (D. Mass. 2011)); Next Phase, 284 F.R.D. at 171 (“the Court recognizes that, if the
Motion Picture is considered obscene, it may not be eligible for copyright protection.” (pointing to
Liberty Media Holdings, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444)); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15 Civ. 4369,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751, at *13 (citing Next Phase); Malibu Media, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112187, at *23–24 (citing defendant’s argument that Next Phase questioned the eligibility of obscene
motion pictures, but clarifying that “for the limited purposes of this Motion for Discovery, the fact that
[the plaintiff] is a registered copyright owner of the Motion Picture satisfies the requirement of a prima
facie showing of copyright infringement.” (citing Next Phase, at 171) (emphasis original).
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John Doe suits, seeking to subpoena ISPs for subscriber identifications.47
Most were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff having succeeded in
acquiring subscriber identifications by third-party subpoenas.48 Through
2014, 54 rulings were made in six districts regarding multiple John Doe
defendants, mostly sorting through and ruling on the appropriateness of
joinder.49 Since then (i.e., 2015–2016), 33 rulings have been made in three
districts regarding individual John Does, likely filed in response to
severance decisions in most of the multiple John Doe cases.50 Of those that
even mentioned the plaintiff’s copyright registration, most accepted it as
sufficient ownership to support a prima facie claim for expedited discovery
without consideration of or even mention that copyright protection might
be compromised by the downloaded film’s content.
A few of those that accepted plaintiff’s ownership added in brief
manner that it was still an open question as to whether obscene materials
were eligible for copyright protection. In the Third Circuit, for example,
one of the 15 John Doe cases referencing Next Phase as precedent
regarding joinder issues footnoted that the doctrine of content neutrality in
copyright remained an open question.51 In the Sixth Circuit, in each of two
of the 16 cases filed against multiple John Does in 2012–2013, two
individual John Does argued directly that plaintiffs might not be eligible for
copyright protection, both referencing the Liberty Media footnote in Next
Phase.52 However, in each of those cases, the Court was unable to reconcile
47.
48.

See generally Sag, supra note 1.
Id.; see also Roy Strom, In a Rare Scene, Malibu Media Takes a Loss, CHI. DAILY LEGAL
BULLETIN (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Archives/2016/02/09/copyright-02-09-16
(citing research by the firm Lex Machina indicating 84% of 5,207 Malibu suits in the past four years
‘likely settled’ with summary judgments issued in only two cases).
49. First District: 16; Second District: 5; Third District: 10; Sixth District: 16; Eighth District: 2;
Ninth District: 2; Eleventh District: 3.
50. Second District: 11 (2 in 2016); Third District: 5 (none in 2016); Ninth District: 25 (all in
E.D. Calif. in 2016, through Oct. 25). All of the rulings admit that there is an inconsistent record
between districts and even within districts on the propriety of joinder, depending on circumstances, as
described in Dragon Quest Prods., LLC v. John Does 1–100, No. 12-6611, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83683, at *9–23 (D.N.J. June 13, 2013) and summarized in Next Phase, 284 F.R.D. at 168–69.
51. Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–16, 902 F. Supp. 2d 690, 700 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“at
least one court [Next Phase] has relied, albeit in part, on the possibility that a motion picture considered
obscene may not be eligible for copyright protection” and remarking that neither the Third Circuit nor
the Supreme Court had addressed the issue, but other circuits had determined or endorsed that copyright
laws are not content-based).
52. Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–28, No. 12-CV-12598, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189311,
at *25–28 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–33, No. 4:12-CV-13309,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50674, *31–33 (E.D. Mich. February 27, 2013). Both cases quoting extensively
from the discussion in Next Phase—quoting from Liberty Media—as raising the prospect that an
obscene film may not be eligible for copyright protection, but also citing the holding of content
neutrality in Mitchell Bros. and repeating Next Phase’s assertion that “judges across the country and
within this district have reached different conclusions on this issue.” See Next Phase, 284 F.R.D. at 171.
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that argument with the plaintiffs’ subsequent plea for severance based on
the uniqueness of each’s circumstance and defense. Were they advocating
joinder, as implied by arguing plaintiff ineligibility which would affect all
John Does similarly, or against joinder?53 In the Eighth Circuit, two claims
against multiple John Does in 2013 argued joinder issues along Next Phase
lines without mentioning copyright eligibility at all. In the Ninth Circuit, all
17 cases filed in 2016 against individual John Does accepted each
plaintiff’s copyright registration as valid, citing Next Phase but again
without mentioning eligibility. In the Eleventh Circuit, the same pattern
occurred in three cases filed in 2012–13.
It is, therefore, impossible to substantiate Next Phase’s proposition
that judges in the Second, and other circuits have reached conflicting
conclusions on content exceptionalism from the commonly-accepted ruling
in Mitchell Bros. Of the rulings in the Second Circuit, only Devils Films
can be said to have taken issue with Mitchell Bros. in denying preliminary
relief based on its own judgment that some of the films were obscene and
their producer’s operation was clearly criminal. However, the Circuit then
offered a series of confusing caveats, the first being that as a preliminary
judgment the Court did not have to consider whether obscene works were
ineligible for relief—the issue that Mitchell Bros. had arguably settled. But
the ruling had clearly done just that, following what has been assumed to
be the doctrinal reasoning of the early nineteenth century rulings of Lord
Eldon—obscene materials were criminal in nature and ineligible for
copyright protection. The Court then asserted its discretion to accept or
reject the Mitchell Bros. position on the issue in future Second Circuit
cases, without saying it was rejecting it in that case (which it arguably had).
Finally, continuing to argue the case it maintained was not before it, the
Court took direct issue with the Mitchell Bros. reasoning that the statutory
history of copyright protection supported an explicit congressional
unwillingness to establish content exceptionalism, countering that it
“strains credulity” that Congress intended copyright protection for obscene
materials.54

53. Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–28, No. 12-CV-12598, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189311,
at *27–28 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) (“it is not clear which way the Does’ argument cuts: if Doe 18
and 25 intend to assert that the Work is not entitled to copyright protection, that defense would
presumably be available to all Defendants, which, in turn, favors joinder.”); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John
Does 1–33, No. 4:12-CV-13309, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50674, at *33 (E.D. Mich. February 27, 2013)
(repeating verbatim Malibu Media, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189311, *27–28, for Does 8 and 27).
54. Here the Court missed the point made by Mitchell Bros., i.e., that Congress had explicitly
avoided any content exceptionalism rather than it was favoring or disfavoring one type of content by
not specifying content limitations.
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After Devils Films, the echoes of content exceptionalism grow
decidedly more confusing. In Nova, the Court definitively rejected the
defendant’s Devils Films claim that obscene films did not warrant
copyright protection and instead stated that a film’s potential criminality
was the province of a jury to decide.55 In Liberty Media, the Court in fact
agreed with Mitchell Bros. that obscenity was not a litmus test for
copyright protection eligibility and content criminality was for a jury to
decide, but then averred in its often-cited footnote that the issue apparently
resolved by the reasoning in Mitchell Bros. remained “unsettled in many
circuits.”56 However, because that issue was not before it, it offered no
opinion on it.57
After that, in a smattering of district court cases beginning with Next
Phase, each successive court accompanied its ruling with one or both of
two reflections back to the footnote in Liberty Media that: (1) if a film at
issue were obscene, it may not be eligible for copyright protection,
implicitly not accepting Mitchell Bros. as doctrinally compelling unless it
was embraced in future by a range of appeals decisions or by the U.S.
Supreme Court; and (2) the case law on the issue was “unsettled,” with
judges “all over the country” coming to different conclusions. Neither of
these positions was accompanied by a substantive argument. Their
positions were in effect briefing points having little to do with the issues
being argued in the case, based on the footnote in, or out of context from
Liberty Media that had referred to Devils Films.58 Ironically, while some
courts have mentioned one or both points, some did so and then rejected
one or both of them and others simply referenced them back to Next Phase.
55. Nova Prods. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 03-Civ. 4259, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004).
56. Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File and John Does 1–38, 821 F. Supp.
2d 444, 447 n.2.
57. Id.
58. A telling example may be Malibu Media LLC v. John Does 1–6, 291 F.R.D. 191, 198 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) in which John Doe 2, without counsel, argued in his brief that illegal and immoral works have
no right to copyright protection, citing “the Rule in Priestley’s case.” Doe 2 was in fact simply quoting
five paragraphs from the defendant’s brief in Malibu Media, LLC v. Fantalis, No. 12-CV-00886-MEH,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150812 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2012), neither even explaining the reference. Mitchell
Bros. did not actually cite Priestley, stating only that “the theory that a person can have no property in
obscene works, merely expresses by means of a legal fiction the underlying judicial moral conclusion
that the work is not worthy of protection . . . [a] doctrine [that] has not been adopted in this country . . .
and should not be.” Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir.
1979) (emphasis added); EATON S. DRONE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF
LITERATURE AND ART, AND PLAYRIGHT IN DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS 183–84 n.1
(1879) (stating that “the authority of a nisi prius dictum of Lord Chief Justice Eyre at the trial of Dr.
Priestley” had resulted in that theory, but referred to it as an Eldonian doctrine rather than a Priestley
rule); see also Alexander, supra note 5, at 232–42 (discussing Priestley).
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So the echoes in Next Phase can be traced back through Liberty Media
to Devils Films, at least enough to remind us of the common law doctrine
of content exceptionalism if not to actually reassert or re-argue it. Since
virtually all of the relevant swarm cases never reach litigation, we have
seen no substantive defense arguments beyond a court’s simply noting the
prospect that a plaintiff may not be eligible for copyright protection despite
having a valid copyright registration. Implicitly but never mentioned in
rulings simply raising the point without discussion or reference, the court
would then have to use its discretion to deny equitable relief on public
policy grounds. Certainly no court, including arguably Devils Films, has
directly ruled in support of content exceptionalism.
Finally, it has been argued that the doctrine of content neutrality
advanced by Mitchell Bros. may be weakened by the language of the
Copyright Clause itself, that protected materials should be limited to those
that promote progress in the sciences and useful arts.59 However, Mitchell
Bros. did not argue that the Congress lacked authority under the Copyright
Clause to establish content-based standards but rather that it had
historically chosen not to and, furthermore, courts were ill-equipped to
parse copyright eligibility without clearer guidance from Congress.60
Moreover, a national copyright eligibility standard that discriminated based
on content might not withstand application of diverse “community
standards” under Miller.61 And, any congressional effort to specify content
limitations would have to balance implicit social harm against the prospect
that all materials have some informational value.62 This would have to be
done without setting an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of
copyright protection.63

59. See generally Haber, supra note 7; Ned Snow, Discrimination in the Copyright Clause, 67
ALA. L. REV. 583, 603 n.108 (2016). This point was one among a battery of defense claims raised but
not argued in Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., No. 12-CV-469-YGR, 2012 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 52551, at *5
(N.D. Cal. April 13, 2012) (alleging plaintiff’s “work is not copyrightable under Article I, Section 8 of
the United State Constitution because it is pornography, which is not a work that promotes the progress
of science and the useful arts”), and was not addressed as the parties quickly settled.
60. Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 861 (“it is evident to us that it is inappropriate for a court, in the
absence of some guidance or authorization from the legislature, to interpose its moral views between an
author and his willing audience”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“[courts] are
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however
debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”).
61. Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 858, 861 (stating that a congressionally-enacted obscenity
exception “would fragment the uniform national standards of the copyright system” and “frustrate the
congressional purpose underlying an all-inclusive copyright statute.”).
62. See Haber, supra note 7, at 468–469.
63. See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 422; see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97 (1989).
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THE COURT AS CENSOR MORUM

That courts might use their own discretion to parse among registered
copyrighted materials harkens back to the doctrine of content
exceptionalism associated with the rulings of Lord Chancellor Eldon,
which state that materials of a criminally libel (or illicit) nature were
ineligible for equitable relief or even consideration because their intent was
to bring harm to the public.64 Plaintiffs bringing copyright infringement
claims regarding such materials were considered to be approaching the
court with “unclean hands,” i.e., having treated the public at large in an
inequitable fashion by publishing such offending materials. Subsequent
case law and widely-accepted treatises at the time and through the first half
of the twentieth century identified the doctrine with Eldon’s ruling in
Southey v. Sherwood65 and a series of other supporting Chancery cases in
the early 1820s.66
In most legal sources, Southey has been cited as precedent together
with Walcot,67 which itself had referenced a ruling at assizes in Dr.
Priestley’s Case in which Lord Chief Justice Eyre denied property damages
for the plaintiff’s manuscripts and journals lost in a fire on the presumption
that his prior writings were notoriously republican in nature and likely
criminal.68 In that volatile period, the question of content exceptionalism in
copyright focused almost entirely on the publication of allegedly seditious
writings that promoted republicanism against the Monarchy, brought the
Crown and its government into disrepute, or advocated a constitutional
reform or even revolution.69 However, the writings in Walcot were satirical
odes lampooning the Crown and the government rather than polemic

64. See, e.g., Paul M. Zall, Lord Eldon’s Censorship, 68 PMLA 436, 436–38 (1953) (arguing that,
contrary to the standard Chancery practice of issuing temporary injunctions against literary piracy,
Eldon established himself as censor morum by denying injunctions against piracy of materials
considered injurious).
65. Southey v. Sherwood (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008 (Ch) (denying injunctive relief for a
literary work based on his prior ruling in Walcot and citing Eyre’s principle “that a person cannot
recover damages for a work which is, in its nature, calculated to do injury to the public.”).
66. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 282–291.
67. Id. at 248–253 (subsequent references in established legal treatises throughout this period and
accompanying text).
68. Dr. Priestley’s Case (1791) (CPD, nisi prius). There exists no published report of Priestley
other than its mention arguendo in Southey. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 232 n.58.
69. See generally Clive Emsley, An Aspect of Pitt’s ‘Terror’: Prosecutions for Sedition During the
1790s, 6 SOC. HIST. 155 (1981) (tracing prosecutions of reformist writers in the 1790s); JOHN BARRELL,
IMAGINING THE KING’S DEATH; FIGURATIVE TREASON, FANTASIES OF REGICIDE 1793–1796 (2000)
(documenting how radicalization of the reform literature in the 1790s caused the government to reconceptualize the laws of sedition and treason).
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republican tracts.70 They were nevertheless pointed and biting, and
commercially successful at the expense of George III and William Pitt’s
ministry, perhaps disrespectful enough to be seen as advancing the cause of
radical reform.71 In short, Wolcot’s satirical verse danced perilously close
to the edge of prosecution for seditious libel, and on two occasions the
filing of a criminal information against him was seriously discussed in
Privy Council.72
In practicality, Walcot became the source of the doctrine of content
exceptionalism as it was arguably the first direct application of the clean
hands doctrine to copyright. In that case, Eldon accepted as an established
governing principle Eyre’s dictum that there could be no property in illicit
writings and, he argued, without property at issue Chancery would have no
jurisdiction over any claims regarding their copyright.73 In law and equity,
this would have barely raised an eyebrow, except that in Walcot, denial of
equity jurisdiction portended a proliferation of rather than a limitation on
those writings in the marketplace. However Eldon was more cautious than
Eyre. Instead of declaring the contested writings to be criminally illicit and
therefore not property, he declared their nature an open question to be
determined by a jury and, if they were accepted as property at law (thereby
implicitly not criminal), the plaintiff could then return to Chancery for
equitable relief.
As Walcot has been portrayed as establishing the governing principle
for content exceptionalism in copyright, a careful inspection of its
particulars and context may be useful. On the surface, it seemed to hold
that writings of an illicit nature could not be considered property for
purposes of equitable relief as a matter of public policy, since to provide
relief would entail using judicial authority to support criminal action
against the public. This was quite conventional reasoning, as an application
of the clean hands doctrine – publishers of illicit writings were harming the
70. See generally GARY DYER, BRITISH SATIRE AND THE POLITICS OF STYLE, 1789–1832, at 8–38
(1997).
71. See JOHN BARRELL, THE SPIRIT OF DESPOTISM: INVASIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE 1790S, at 103–
144 (2006) (describing three Wolcot publications criticizing the Treasonable and Seditious Practices
Act (1795) 36 Geo. 3 c.7, that precipitated government threats of his prosecution that were, after thirdparty mediation, not actively pursued).
72. Id. at 138–141. A criminal information was a mechanism for seeking an indictment directly
from King’s Bench rather than petitioning a grand jury, as a matter of expediency given the presumed
immediacy of need for resolution; see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 304 (5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1765–1769); see also infra notes 123 and 124.
73. Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch) (“If the doctrine of Lord Chief Justice Eyre (Dr.
Priestley’s Case, see 2 Mer. 437) is right, and I think it is, that publications may be of such a nature,
that the author can maintain no action at law, it is not the business of this Court . . . to decree either an
injunction or an account of the profits of works of such a nature, that the author can maintain no action
at law for the invasion of that, which he calls his property.”) (Italics in original).
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public and asking the Court’s assistance to continue; of course the Court
should refuse collusion in the publisher’s criminality. Yet, if the denial of
jurisdiction to the purveyor of illicit writings exposed those writings to
unrestrained copyright infringement, particularly rampant reprinting at
cheaper prices, the Court would appear to have been tacitly (even
knowingly) complicit in their proliferation.
At the time, Eldon’s ruling in Walcot passed virtually unnoticed,
except perhaps because its unsuccessful plaintiff was the extremely popular
and commercially-successful satirical poet John Wolcot, who published
under the pseudonym of ‘Peter Pindar.’ It appeared to reflect a relatively
standard exercise of judicial discretion in denying equitable relief for
infringements against copyrighted but nonetheless arguably libelous or
illegal writings. But after Eldon’s more public Southey ruling fifteen years
later, the legal community began to express misgivings.74 While it may
have been appropriate to deny copyright protection to illicit writings, it had
been effectuated solely by judicial discretion rather than by legislative
action or after jury deliberation. Eldon seemed to have positioned himself
as the sole arbiter of illicitness in publication, ex mero moto, without even a
veiled hint of democratic participation in the process.75 This is precisely the
type of judicial paternalism that the Fox Libel Act76 had sought to
overcome at law in the late eighteenth century.
While critics of Eldon’s authoritarianism focused on its threat to the
democratic balance in judicial proceedings by substituting judicial
discretion for jury deliberation, they expressed little concern for the
consequences of his ruling on the dissemination of such illicit publications.
Denying the author of illicit works the monopolistic benefits of copyright
74. The use of Southey as ratio for subsequent cases in 1822 spawned a debate between the Tory
QUARTERLY REVIEW, which initially praised Eldon for his cautiousness in not superseding the
Attorney-General in the prevention of libelous writings and the Whig EDINBURGH REVIEW, which
found Eldon’s discretionary judgment not only in contradistinction to precedent but also sourced in his
pro-government bias as a member of the cabinet. See Art. VI. – Cases of Walcot v. Walker; Southey v.
Sherwood; Murray v. Benbow, and Lawrence v. Smith., XXVII Q. REV. 123, 134–135 (1822); Art. I.
Reports of Cases argued and decided in the High Court of Chancery. By F. Vesey, Junior. Vol. VII. –
Dr. Wolcot’s Case, 1802. – Mr. Southey’s Case, 1817. Lord Byron’s Cain, Feb. 1822. – Mr.
Lawrence’s Lectures on Physiology, March 1822., XXXVIII EDIN. REV. 281, 313–314 (1823).
75. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 278 n.231. Eldon’s ruling is actually more fluid than that, in
essence stating he would preliminarily review the contested works to see if they might be of illicit
nature and, if so, send them to law (“before I uphold any injunction, I will see these publications, and
determine the nature of them; . . . [i]f upon inspection the work appears innocent, I will act . . .; if
criminal, I will not act at all; and, if doubtful, I will send that question to law.”). Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at
1.
76. An Act to Remove Doubts Respecting the Functions of Juries In Cases of Libels (1792) 32
Geo. 3 c. 60 (expanding the considerations of juries to all aspects of the case, including intentions of the
defendants). See JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 218–235 (2004)
(on the legal and political dynamics leading to its passage).
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protection appeared at first glance an appropriate means of dissuading
authors from publishing such works and thereby protecting public morals
from assault. But, as Eldon himself recognized in Southey, the practical
consequence would prove to be quite the opposite:
It is very true that, in some cases, [the denial of an
injunction] may operate so as to multiply copies of
mischievous publications by the refusal of the Court to
interfere by restraining them; but to this my answer is, that,
sitting here as a Judge upon a mere question of property, I
have nothing to do with the nature of the property, nor with
the conduct of the parties except as it relates to their civil
interests; and if the publication be mischievous, either on
the part of the author or of the bookseller, it is not my
business to interfere with it.77
For the Court to withhold copyright protection from illicit works
might well further expand their distribution as down-market publishers
printed and sold unauthorized copies of copyrighted but nonetheless illicit
works in smaller format and lower prices, and without threat of legal
retribution. However, working in a fickle but commercially lucrative
market of high product demand, authors of illicit writings were often
undaunted by the prospect of not controlling the market for their works via
copyright protection and were actually emboldened and even enriched by
the portrayal of their works as illicit or even illegal.78

IV. WALCOT V. WALKER AS THE WELLSPRING OF CONTENT
EXCEPTIONALISM
Walcot v. Walker was not a typical copyright infringement case of
surreptitious counterfeiting and sale of a work registered to another. It was
instead an author’s claim that his own publisher had overstepped the
bounds of consignment of his titles. The consignment had been a
77. Southey v. Sherwood (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008. (emphasis added).
78. These same disincentives to aggressive copyright enforcement exist in the current market for
pornographic materials. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual
Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 965 (2010) (“giving intellectual property rights to an
industry that has little need for an incentive can be counterproductive because the negative effects of the
entitlement predominate.”); Snow, supra note 59, at 628 (the denial of copyright protection potentially
having disincentive effect only on producers that rely on copyright protection, which excludes most in
the current market, and especially amateur producers).
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ramshackle mix of verbal discussions extending over eight months and a
bundle of unstated or poorly phrased conditions, wrapped in a temporary
deed poll with a memorandum written on the back and titles list attached,
secured by a bond, without a final engrossed agreement. And Walker and
his partners were hardly small-scale bootleggers engaged in clandestine
operations, rather they were among the most reputable booksellers in
London. While author-publisher disputes were not uncommon in the late
eighteenth century London bookselling market, this one festered for over
seven years and was resolved by a ruling at Chancery court that ostensibly
established the doctrine of content exceptionalism in copyright.
As a satirical poet in late Georgian England, John Wolcot’s stock-intrade was faux epics, epistles, odes, and random quips published under the
pseudonym of Peter Pindar offering mocking praise of the King, the
government, and notables of station. First published in the London
MORNING POST as small pieces, his works quickly captured the attention
and amusement of the reading middle class, especially those who thrived
on political criticism. They were published in small elegant pamphlets of
verse, at one or two shillings at first, but sold in the thousands, many titles
between 1785 and 1790 reaching ten or eleven editions.79 However, while
Wolcot’s lampooning of the governing elite captured the public’s fancy (as
well as their coin), it also drew the ire of those targeted and frequently
raised the prospect of his prosecution for libel. Most dangerous among
those were threats of criminal informations briefed against him by the
government for seditious libel in response to his cryptic and disrespectful
satires of the King or the Pitt ministry. On at least two occasions, his
prosecution was only avoided by mediated negotiations, resulting in his
desisting from further pointed criticism for a period.80
Wolcot’s relationship with the booksellers who marketed his titles was
always contentious. Book publishing in the London market was highly
competitive, and groups of booksellers (and other secondary investors)
would form publishing groups, called congers, to pool capital to purchase
copyrights to literary works, giving them sole and exclusive rights over

79. See James R. Alexander, Publishing Peter Pindar: Production, Profits and Piracy in
Georgian Satire, 112 PAPERS BIBLIOGRAPHY. SOC’Y AM. (forthcoming 2018) (documenting the
publishing career of John Wolcot).
80. See generally BARRELL, supra note 71. The government’s threats of prosecution and
subsequent negotiations for annuities are also described in JOHN TAYLOR, II RECORDS OF MY LIFE
364–365 (1833); WILLIAM JERDAN, II THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM JERDAN 265 (4 vols. 1852–
1853); CYRUS REDDING, II FIFTY YEARS’ RECOLLECTION, LITERARY AND PERSONAL 271–272 (3 vols.
1858).
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distribution of those titles for the duration of their statutory protection.81 In
‘the trade,’ as it was called, the most effective congers stockpiled
copyrights to classical and standard works for which market demand was
continuous and profits assured, thereby controlling all elements potentially
affecting their profit margin on titles, including printing costs, retail and
wholesale distribution as well as auctioning leftover stock, advertising, and
price. The larger the number of titles commanded, the more of the
bookselling market the congers could control through distribution and
could leverage retail price conformity of smaller retailers, thereby earning
their common vilification as ‘bibliopolists.’82
Congers used the same strategy to manipulate the market for popular
titles such as poetry and novels by entering into formal agreements with
new or established authors (like Wolcot) to purchase exclusive rights to
current or future titles, each for a one-time fee that could range into
hundreds and on occasion thousands of pounds for a work of the most
famous contemporary authors. While the market for popular titles was
characteristically faddish and short-lived – from six months to two years –
and made such investments an uncertain business, the ever-expanding
middle-class readership consumed popular titles at a rate that made the
immediate retail market fairly lucrative for those who carefully controlled
production costs and anticipated the market capacity for newer editions of
popular titles.83
That Wolcot published pamphlets rather than books of verse allowed
him to respond more agilely in a reading market hungry for political
commentary. He was one of few authors who did not sell his copyrights
outright, at least not at first. Instead, he negotiated his own deals with
printers and controlled every facet of how his works appeared, from the
look of the title page, to the weight and quality of paper, and even the
inclusion of advertisements, messages to the reading audience, and
occasionally an engraved frontispiece. He also dictated the size of print
runs and whether/when to commission a new edition. He then consigned
copies of his titles to booksellers’ networks in London (usually through one
primary publisher) and later the English provinces and Edinburgh, and they

81. See ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 20–22 (2010).
82. See generally WILLIAM ZACHS, THE FIRST JOHN MURRAY AND THE LATE EIGHTEENTHCENTURY LONDON BOOK TRADE 66–86 (1998); JAMES RAVEN, PUBLISHING BUSINESS IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND (2014).
83. See ALEX WEEDON, VICTORIAN PUBLISHING: THE ECONOMICS OF BOOK PRODUCTION FOR A
MASS MARKET, 1836–1916, at 92–99 (2003).
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in turn retailed or redistributed stock and handled advertising and sales for
an agreed-to commission plus costs.
It was the dickering with booksellers over the commission, rebates for
returned (unsold) copies, rates charged for labor or paper, and handling and
advertising costs that Wolcot found most distasteful. He developed a
prickly distrust of booksellers, assuming that they always wanted the
profits of his own labors for themselves, always padded their costs and
calculations of overstock, and constantly undervalued the market to gain a
better commission rate. And he was ever on the lookout for bookseller
deviousness in accounts and willing (with his sizable market clout) to
negotiate distribution through different booksellers when he sensed an
advantage for doing so, or if his personal relationship with one bookseller
soured.
Wolcot first considered selling his copyrights in 1793 and entered into
an oral agreement (or ‘treaty’) with booksellers John Walker, George
Goulding, George Robinson, his brother John and his son George
Robinson, Jr., in early October for the sale of all individual works he had
previously published to date, ultimately totaling thirty-seven titles, for an
annuity of £250 secured by a £5,000 bond.84 Wolcot was to deliver all
copies he had in stock and had the option of providing corrections to any
future published editions. While he was free to continue to publish new
individual titles, Wolcot had initially promised the conger first refusal on
the copyrights of any titles he chose to sell. The conger in turn agreed to
actively market the purchased titles, and proper substitution of parties
should one or more of the members of the conger die or fail to meet his part
of the obligation.85
The original agreement had been drawn up by Walker’s counsel,
engrossed and dated October 3, 1793, and delivered to Wolcot, who
reportedly returned it unsigned and “in a mutilated and unusable state,”
84. By all accounts, the agreement was patched together from a series of informal discussions
between Wolcot and Goulding regarding the prospective sale, but once the terms were set in writing,
the lead partner in Wolcot’s dealings with the conger became Walker, who had already published a
number of Wolcot’s individual titles by himself or with Goulding. Details of the negotiations and
various interpretations of the agreement have been gleaned documents filed in two cases at Chancery
involving the principals: Robinson v. Wolcot, The National Archives (U.K.), (hereinafter NA),
C13/8/34, including bill of complaint (Nov. 15, 1798), answer (July 24, 1800), amended bill (Oct. 22,
1800), and amended answer (Dec. 22, 1801) (plaintiff requesting injunctive relief from Wolcot’s action
at law to attach the bond for nonpayment of the annuity and accounting of all profits for titles published
by Wolcot but not offered to the conger); and Walcot v. Walker, NA, C13/2065/36, including Bill of
Complaint (Feb. 2, 1802), and Answer (Feb. 26, 1802) (plaintiff requesting injunctive relief from
Walker’s unauthorized publication and sale of his copyrighted titles, and an accounting of copies on
hand and profits to date).
85. See Robinson v. Wolcot, (1802) C13/8/34; Walcot v. Walker, C13/2065/36.
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presumably because he felt it unsatisfactorily captured what he believed
were the terms of the agreement. He then had his own counsel prepare a
different version, together with a list of the titles, to which the conger did
not object, but neither had they signed it, now wishing to reduce the
annuity.86 At each successive drafting, the conger pressed for more
specification on the conditions, particularly that new titles, if for sale, be
offered to them first at a fair price or that they would be allowed to meet a
bona fide market offer from another publisher; that if Wolcot published
new titles, the conger would be at liberty to include them in its octavo
volumes of THE WORKS OF PETER PINDAR but not singly without the
author’s permission; and that the annuity be apportioned to each of member
of the conger, under a future instrument to be signed by the parties. In the
interim, the agreement was to be executed under a short deed poll
authorizing the transfer of property and attaching a memorandum
expressing the conditions, likewise dated June 7, 1794.87
By third party accounts, the agreement was drafted so hastily, “with a
very illaudable degree of obscurity,”88 that through their attorneys both
parties immediately began to contest its interpretation and its arrangements
for payments, ultimately seeking resolution at common law and then at
equity.89 Initially members of the conger began to withhold annuity
86. See Walcot v. Walker, C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker. Walker and his partners
suspected they had been manipulated into accepting an annuity strung out over the life of the author
rather than a one-time flat rate of about £500 by Wolcot’s feigning serious illness during negotiations,
which the conger had in turn attempted to capitalize on by quickly agreeing to the annuity. The conger
also reportedly chafed that the value of the property in those titles had been diminished by the recently
enacted Treasonable and Sedition Practices Act (An Act for the Safety and Preservation of His
Majesty’s Person and Government against Treasonable and Seditious Practices and Attempts (1795) 36
Geo. III, c.7) that further restrained libelous writings and potentially exposing publishers of criminally
libelous titles to prosecution, particularly as Wolcot had conceded that one of the titles sold to the
conger contained a libel and he had avoided prosecution by withdrawing it from publication.
87. Id. The signed deed poll gave the conger unilateral discretion (without obligation) to publish
any/all so designated works as they wished, but still required the annuity be paid regardless, in effect
prepaying for the option of publishing the designated titles. There is no evidence that Wolcot or Walker
filed a copy of the deed poll with their documents at Chancery and no copy has been found. By the
account of both parties, the memorandum was written on the back of the deed poll, with a list of titles
attached. Despite their stated intentions, there is no evidence that a final instrument was agreed to or
signed by the parties, leaving each to interpret the deed poll to best advantage.
88. Dr. Wolcot, IV ANNUAL BIOGRAPHY AND OBITUARY FOR THE YEAR 1820, at 283 (London:
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820). The various reports of the negotiations, based
primarily on recollections reported in Dr. Wolcot, at 252–254, and JERDAN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra
note 80, at 265, reveal that neither party seems to have been above seeking unfair advantage. In the end,
Wolcot clearly prevailed by opting for the annuity since he outlived all of the original partners in the
conger, leaving their heirs burdened with the annuity until his own death in 1819.
89. That the agreement required clarification after clarification, and still ended up disputed in
Chancery is testimony to how anxious each party was to gain advantage by quickly signing the initial
deed poll, prompting Wolcot’s principal biographer to reflect that “documents signed in haste are often
a rich source of income for the lawyers.” TOM GIRTIN, DOCTOR WITH TWO AUNTS: A BIOGRAPHY OF
PETER PINDAR 155 (London: Hutchinson, 1959).
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payments, maintaining that Wolcot failed to comply in good faith with his
agreement to offer them new titles and hoping to leverage more favorable
treatment.90 Wolcot countered by suing the conger at law for nonpayment
and sought court permission to attach the bond. In this he failed, apparently
having not provided sufficient evidence on breaches and damages to
warrant issuing a writ and summoning a jury.91 Nonetheless, his filing suit
jarred the conger, which then immediately sought and gained a temporary
injunction staying Wolcot’s action at law which, after delays awaiting
subsequent amendments to bills and answers, apparently remained in effect
without a hearing on the cause.92
Finally, after the conger included new but unpurchased titles in their
1802 octavo vol. V of Pindar’s WORKS, Wolcot sued for copyright
infringement. Documents submitted by both parties referred to the
memorandum written on the back of the deed poll and an attached list of
thirty-four titles previously published to which the agreement referred.93
And both parties admitted that the list was incomplete, having left off three
titles also published by that time.94 For further clarification, Walker
produced a receipt for £125, presumably the first half-year annuity
payment, signed by Wolcot and dated June 17, 1794, with the notation “for
all works already printed and published by me,” 95 which both parties
agreed gave the conger liberty to publish a total of thirty-seven titles.
The principal dispute springing from the agreement was over whether
the conger had discretion to include new titles in its octavo editions of
Pindar’s WORKS without additional compensation or agreement. This issue
had been festering since contested drafts of the original agreement were
90. Under the conger’s recollection of their October 1793 verbal agreement, Wolcot was to offer
for sale the copyright for £50 for each title of at least 42 pages quarto, but Wolcot maintained that the
deed poll and memorandum superseded that and gave him leeway to offer new titles at a fair price. By
his own admission, Wolcot only offered the conger titles he thought of marginal market value, and so
radically over-priced his better pieces as to preclude the conger from purchasing them, which the conger
considered bad faith and contrary to their agreement.
91. See Walcot v. Goulding (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1303 (KB).
92. See Robinson v. Wolcot, (1802) C13/8/34. The conger’s petition for injunctive relief against
Wolcot’s suit failed and they had to pay £20 in court costs and agree to semi-annual payments but some
continued to miss payments, especially after the principal had died and his obligation passed to his
family. The acrimony over annuity payments continued sporadically right up to Wolcot’s death, the
Robinson family at least once in arrears on its share in 1817. See KENNETH HOPKINS, PORTRAITS IN
SATIRE 267 (London: Barrie Books, 1958).
93. See Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36.
94. These included two titles individually purchased and published by Walker “Pathetic Odes”
(publ. Sept. 1793) and “Celebration” (publ. Jan. 1794), and one unregistered title “A Commiserating
Epistle to James Lowther, Earl of Lonsdale” (London: James Evans, Nov. 1791) (hereinafter “Epistle to
Lonsdale”), which Wolcot stated in the agreement contained a libel that caused him to cease its
publication.
95. See Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake, NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802).
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exchanged but apparently never arose in a manner requiring formal
resolution until 1796. In early January of that year, Walker published vol.
IV of the octavo set of Pindar’s WORKS including five new (arguably
unauthorized) titles.96 This immediately prompted discussions between
Wolcot and his attorney Thomas Holloway, who advised Wolcot that the
new volume had been printed for Walker “without [Wolcot’s] privity and
consent” and his perusal of the bond regarding the annuity indicated it
covered his “works up to No. 34,” and, in any case, not the additional five
titles. Holloway therefore pressed Wolcot to see Walker personally before
further action was contemplated.97
The next week, Wolcot notified Holloway that Walker sought an
amicable settlement but nonetheless directed his attorney to procure a copy
of vol. IV “in order to ground the action and to have it ready to prove in the
trial of the intended act against Mr. Walker if necessary.”98 In late April,
Walker having not conceded on the issue, Holloway prepared the filing of
“a bill in Equity for an injunction to restrain the defendant from selling the
fourth volume . . . unless [Walker] settled in two or three days.”99 While
there was apparently no further discussion of that particular matter for
some time, Holloway also drew Wolcot’s attention to “several other
printers have been selling other Editions of [his] works” and reviewed the
next steps to be taken against their infringement, adding at the end of his
ledger notation “and it was concluded not to declare against Walker for the
present.”100

96. Both Wolcot’s claim and Walker’s answer portrayed the infringement in volume IV to be the
inclusion of four titles, but later in each document acknowledged a fifth “The Lousiad, Canto V and
Last,” probably not claimed by Wolcot because it was one of very few titles he neglected to register.
97. This sequence is described in the ledger pages of attorney Thomas Holloway found in the
John Wolcot Papers, Sir George Grey Special Collections, Auckland (NZ) Central Library, GMS 5, vol.
II, at 33 (Jan. 7–8, 1796) [hereinafter Wolcot Papers]. Walker’s octavo vols. I–III contained thirty-six
clearly licensed titles but excluded the “Epistle to Lonsdale” which both parties assumed to contain a
libel. Walker’s octavo vol. IV was comprised of five titles (Nos. 37–41) published after June 1794
which Wolcot insisted were unlicensed. The Wolcot Papers are in six volumes, all containers of loose
sheets. Volume 5, which contains letters, ledger sheets and other inventories, is in two volumes. The
loose pages are hand-numbered for cataloguing and here that page number is then specified by date of
entry.
98. Wolcot Papers, supra note 97, at 33 (Jan. 13 & 25, 1796).
99. Id. at 33 (Jan. 29, 1796).
100. Id. at 34 (April 29, 1796). Holloway provides no further reference to discussion of the Walker
action after February 3, 1796, so perhaps Wolcot had wearied of the dispute over those titles which had
cost him not only attorney fees but also filing and copy charges each time he dealt with Chancery. At
that time, in most cases of small-time booksellers publishing unauthorized copies of individual titles,
copyright holders easily secured a settlement for costs and destruction of all infringing copies by having
an attorney send a letter threatening prosecution for damages at Common Pleas, as Wolcot had
regarding Exeter bookseller Joseph M’Kenzie. Id. at 36 (Sept. 9 & 14, 1796).
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It was only after the 1801 publication of the conger’s octavo vol. V
that Wolcot filed a complaint in Chancery asking for injunctive relief and
disgorgement of profits. In it, he detailed Walker’s unauthorized
publication of the five titles in the conger’s 1796 octavo vol. IV and the
additional nine titles in its new vol. V. Complicating the matter but not
mentioned in Wolcot’s claim was the conger’s publication of a duodecimo
edition of Pindar’s WORKS in 1797, the first two volumes containing
purchased titles and the third containing the same contested five pieces as
the octavo vol. IV the year before.101 In the fall of 1800, Walker had
published a fourth volume in the duodecimo edition, including the same
contested nine titles as the octavo vol. V.102
What prompted Wolcot’s copyright infringement complaint in early
1801 rather than five years earlier is a matter of conjecture, probably
related to the market implications of the conger’s interpretation of its
liberty to publish new titles in their octavo edition.103 But our purpose here
is to recognize what was being factually contested and how that was
reflected in Eldon’s ruling. Wolcot’s bill requested an injunction to stay the
conger’s unauthorized publication of his new titles, which Eldon routinely
ordered pending Walker’s answer.104 Walker responded within three weeks,
arguing the agreement allowed the conger to negotiate for publication
rights to any future works as individual pieces but assumed the liberty to
include any subsequently-published new titles in its future octavo editions
at no additional compensation. He derived this interpretation from the
language in the deed poll which seemed to differentiate between the sale of
the copyrights to individual titles and the permission to use individual titles
in octavo editions. As the purchase of the copyrights gave the conger sole
discretion over publication of those titles in any format, Walker reasonably
contended the permissive language regarding the octavo edition referred to
future titles, for which permission and fair price were required only if the

101. Under the Statute of Anne, infringement claims had to be filed within three months of the
alleged infringement; (1709) 8 Anne 19, § 10, a period long past for the 1796 and 1797 volumes, as
Holloway had cautioned. See Wolcot Papers, at 36 (Sept. 29, 1796). Eldon did reference the time lag
regarding the 1796 volume as being germane. See Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1, at 1 (“It is
not immaterial also, that they have been permitted to publish in their trade for six years together without
an action.”).
102. The publication date imprinted on the title page of the duodecimo vol. V is 1801, but
Walker’s answer of Feb. 26, 1802 noted it was published by September/October 1800. See Walcot v.
Walker C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker, lines 22–23.
103. See generally Alexander, supra note 79 (Wolcot realizing he had not anticipated the profit
share he might lose if the conger retained an open-ended liberty to reprint his new titles in future octavo
editions).
104. See Minute Book of Peter Wright, NA, C37/2501 (Feb. 8, 1802); Minute Book of John
Coppinger, NA, C37/2489 (Feb. 8, 1802).
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conger wished to publish them as individual titles but not for their use in
the octavo edition after Wolcot had been published them individually.
This liberal interpretation of the agreement was however confined to
octavo volumes, and Walker conceded his infringement in the duodecimo
edition “through Inadvertance (sic) and Inattention to the terms of the said
memorandum.”105 As ordered, he provided an accounting for all copies in
stock and profits on all editions containing the contested titles and asked
the Court to determine fair compensation on the duodecimo infringement.
Walker also prayed for dissolution of the injunction nisi causa, which was
also routinely granted pending Wolcot’s response and a hearing.106
Wolcot immediately moved against the dissolution, consideration of
which was extended until the next term with the parties “be[ing] at liberty
in the meantime to procure the agreement.”107 In the subsequent hearing on
May 6, 1802, Eldon ordered the injunction on the octavo edition dissolved,
with the plaintiff at liberty to recover at law and then to return for equity
consideration.108 In regard to Walker’s duodecimo edition, a copy of which
had not been provided by Wolcot, Eldon ordered the injunction on that
dissolved as well, unless a copy was provided within the week.109 When the
court reconvened in late May, Wolcot pleaded that the injunction be
maintained until a hearing on cause, which Eldon rejected, ordering the
dissolution on the octavo edition to stand.110 In the same hearing, Walker
moved for dissolution of the injunction on the duodecimo edition, a copy of
which having still not been produced as directed by the Court, and Eldon
ruled that dissolved as well.111
105. Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker, line 54.
106. Id.; see also Minute Book of John Coppinger, NA, C37/2489 (Feb. 27, 1802). Notice to show
cause was delivered on Mar. 4, 1802, as noted in the affidavit of William Wood, NA, C31/303, pg. 2
(Mar. 8, 1802), and in Wainwright’s ledger notes. See Wolcot Papers, supra note 97, at 245 (n.d.)
(recording a charge of two shillings “On being served with an order to dissolve the injunction obtained
in this cause—making two fair copies thereof to annex to briefs”).
107. Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake, NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802).
108. Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch); Minute Book of John Coppinger, NA,
C37/2490 (May 6, 1802); Minute Book of Peter Wright, NA, C37/2502/2 (May 6, 1802); also noted in
attorney Wainwright’s ledgers, Wolcot Papers, supra note 97, at 246 (n.d.) (recording a charge of
thirteen shillings four pence for “Attending court when the motion was fully argued & the Chancellor
ordered the Injunction to be dissolved”). Wolcot’s attorney at Chancery immediately moved for
dissolution of the orders for cause, consideration of which was delayed until the next session two weeks
hence, during which the parties were again encouraged to settle. Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake
NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802) (“Let this motion stand over to the next seal and let the partys (sic) be
at liberty in the meantime to procure the agreement”).
109. Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep., at 2.
110. Dissolution of the injunctions had been ordered on May 27, 1802, prompting Wolcot’s
attorney to immediately move the order be discharged until a full hearing on the cause. That motion was
extended over until May 31, 1802, when Eldon disallowed it, NA, C33/518, f.544v.
111. Minute Book of John Coppinger, NA, C37/2490 (May 31, 1802); Minute Book of Peter
Wright, NA, C37/2502/5 (May 31, 1802).
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RECONSIDERING WALCOT

In his bill of complaint, Wolcot quoted from the endorsed agreement
[T]hat Doctor Wolcot shall give the within mentioned
proprietors the refusal of all his future works at a fair price
in case of sale—the proprietors to have the liberty of
printing in their Octavo Edition any works that Dr. Wolcot
may have published separately upon his own account in
Quarto or otherwise but not to print the same singly
without permission.112
He then clarified that it was never his intention that the conger was to
have the liberty of publishing future works “without first paying for the
copyright thereof,” the words in the memorandum regarding future titles
intended as having “a retrospective and not a prospective meaning.”113
Wolcot further detailed how he had made applications to Walker to desist
from selling further copies of the octavo edition and to turn over all unsold
copies and account for his profits.114 When Walker did not respond to those
entreaties, Wolcot filed his bill of complaint requesting injunctive relief
and an accounting since, he maintained, Walker “insists on his right to
publish the said Poems . . . and intends to publish and sell the same unless
he shall be restrained from so doing so by . . . injunction.”115
Walker responded by providing his own view of the details of the
agreement, quoting the same passage from the endorsed memorandum but
interpreting it to mean that, separate from the refusal clause, once a new
title was published individually, the conger was at liberty to include it in its
octavo editions without negotiating further authorization or
compensation.116 He admitted to having published the contested titles but
maintained that there had been a common understanding going back to
October 1793 that the conger was at liberty to do so in its octavo edition of
WORKS and not singly. Why else would the octavo vol. IV have remained
for sale uncontested for five years, long past the statutory requirement that
it be challenged in a timely manner?117 Walker argued that Wolcot was in
effect claiming against what he had at least tacitly agreed to in the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36, Bill of Complaint of John Wolcot, lines 25–27.
Id. at lines 27–30.
Id. at lines 10–11.
Id. at lines 30–31.
Id.; see also Answer of John Walker, supra note 84, at lines 36–38, 70–71.
Id. at lines 43–46. On the statutory limitation on filings see (1709) 8 Anne 19, § 10.
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memorandum and by his inaction, and was therefore not entitled to share
any profits from the octavo edition.118
Walker then addressed one of the purchased titles, “The Epistle to
Lonsdale,”119 which Wolcot maintained he had stopped publishing to
forestall a libel prosecution.120 Wolcot had not claimed copyright
infringement regarding that particular title as Walker had purchased it, but
he was asking the Court to protect his property in the contested titles from
Walker’s expansive interpretation of the deed poll. For his part, Wolcot
may have initiated specific discussion of the title simply to be inclusive in
the listing of titles already published by him by that date but in doing so he
introduced several complications: first, Wolcot had not registered that title
and could not claim property in it under the Statute of Anne anyway;
second, it may not have been recognized as property even under common
law if it were found in a legal action to have contained a libel; and, third,
selling a legally unpublishable title without notification to the other party
might be considered fraud, sufficient to void the agreement and his annuity.
So Wolcot’s mention of the libelous nature of the title in both the
memorandum and his claim may have been an effort to forestall future
third-party actions against himself should an action be filed against the title
if published in the future or to simply insulate the agreement from claims of
fraud.
Walker assured the court that Wolcot had forewarned him of the
libelous nature of the title and he had not printed or sold any copies of it
individually or in editions.121 For purposes of the infringement claim,
discussion of that title seemed superfluous but it raised the prospect of
Wolcot being ineligible for equitable relief under the clean hands doctrine.
Under the affirmative defense of ‘unclean hands,’ inequities claimed to
disqualify the plaintiff from copyright protection had to be directly related
to the contested issues between the parties, which would have excluded any
matters related to the “Epistle to Lonsdale” other than perhaps as a general
reflection of the possibly questionable nature of his satirical verse.
Obviously the Court would not want to be seen as providing copyright
118. Id. at lines 60–62. If Walker had submitted to copyright violations in the octavo volumes, he
would have had to not only account for profits from those volumes (which he did under subpoena) but
also turn over all unsold copies—the remainder of his inventory that he had estimated at 2,000 copies of
vol. IV and 1,750 copies of vol. V—and been unable to sell them within full sets, as they were
advertised, at a significant loss.
119. See supra note 94.
120. See Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker, line 69.
121. Walker did not include the “Epistle to Lonsdale” in the conger’s five-volume octavo set
1794–1801, or in the two-volume set of individual prints he published in partnership with Goulding in
1793, or in the conger’s three-volume duodecimo set in 1797 or its fourth volume in 1801.
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protection for a title that might subsequently be found criminally libelous.
On the other hand, suspecting or claiming that a title was criminally
libelous was not the same as having a jury finding it so. So, it behooves us
to briefly examine the libel reported by Wolcot and whether it might have
prompted Eldon’s suspicion that any of the contested titles might not be
‘clearly innocent.’
The alleged Lonsdale libel was contained in a Pindarian panegyric of a
comic episode involving the Earl of Lonsdale, perhaps one of the
wealthiest men in England at the time, and covered with unmasked delight
by the London press. The “Epistle to Lonsdale” was a witty verse mocking
the Earl’s ill-treatment of the residents of Whitehaven and the workers in
the collieries there under his charge, and publicly scolded the Earl for being
far too benevolent toward the villagers, given his family’s long and
distinguished heritage of oppressive and tyrannical behavior. Lonsdale took
great exception to this lampooning and pressed for the briefing of criminal
information against Wolcot for libel122 which, after several hearings, was
exhibited and subject to immediate prosecution.123 But Wolcot was never
prosecuted, apparently having settled with the Earl by agreeing to cease
publication124 and leaving unresolved the question of whether the title was
in fact criminally libelous and by extension whether its author could claim
property in it at law.125
For purposes of Wolcot’s infringement claim, resolution of those
issues was unnecessary as it was not one of the contested titles, and would
have been relevant only if that title in some way was directly related to the
challenged publication of the new titles, which it was not. Clean hands, as
it were, was off the table. The issue was thus reduced to whether Walker
could include any new titles in its octavo edition without further agreement
or compensation, a matter of interpreting the language and intent of the
122. King v. Wolcot, NA, KB10/48 (Easter term 1792), as reported in THE (LONDON) TIMES, no.
2224, p. 3 (Feb. 8, 1792); THE (LONDON) TIMES, no. 2227, p. 3 (Feb. 11, 1792).
123. See King v. Wolcot, NA, KB27/45, f.586v (April 27, 1792).
124. A short time thereafter, a small notice appeared in the London newspapers indicating that the
parties had settled, apparently with Wolcot agreeing to no further publication of the title. See THE
(LONDON) TIMES, no. 2335, p. 2 (June 16, 1792). While exhibition of the information was ordered,
there is no record that the normal processes for prosecution were subsequently followed, i.e., Wolcot
was not subpoenaed to appear and plead within four days, notice was not served, the prosecutor did not
file the required recognizance, and the information was not settled, engrossed or filed, all indicating a
quick private settlement. See CRIMINAL CASES ON THE CROWN SIDE OF KING’S BENCH:
STAFFORDSHIRE, 1740–1800, at 40–42 (ed. Douglas Hay, Bristol: Staffordshire Record Society, 2010).
125. Had the processes been followed, the prosecutor would have had to proceed to trial within
one year (i.e., by June 1793) or forfeit costs to the defendant. See DOUGLAS HAY, CRIMINAL CASES ON
THE CROWN SIDE OF KING’S BENCH: STAFFORDSHIRE 40. Even if Wolcot had reneged on his settlement
with Lonsdale, the Earl had forfeited his right to an action at law by pursuing an information and it was
unlikely the Court would grant another information.
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original deed poll and memorandum. This type of issue would have
routinely been directed to the Master of Rolls for study and ruling, or
simply referred back to the parties to work out on their own, which Eldon
had directed twice.126
Deciphering what each of the parties might have intended or
understood in the agreement was often a matter whether their stated
intentions were borne out in their subsequent actions. In this, Walker’s
position appeared to be more compelling, as Wolcot had not contested
Walker’s use of new titles in the octavo vol. IV for five years. However,
Eldon’s ruling never addressed the deed poll but instead narrowed the issue
procedurally to whether Wolcot had property in the titles. After reviewing
the octavo edition and citing Eyre’s dictum that authors of publications of
illicit or criminal nature cannot maintain an action at law, Eldon ruled he
was unable to continue the temporary injunction unless Wolcot could
maintain an action at law, even though Walker had admitted to publication
of contested titles. 127 In addition, Eldon denied even having the jurisdiction
to rule on whether there could be property in the contested titles until their
nature had first been reviewed at law, concluding that, on preliminary
consideration, he could not authoritatively confirm that Wolcot’s writings
were ‘clearly innocent’ in nature.128 So he dissolved the injunction on the
126. See Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake, NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802); Minute Book of
John Coppinger, NA, C37/2490 (May 6, 1802); Minute Book of Peter Wright, NA, C37/2502/2 (May 6,
1802).
127. See Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch). Eyre’s nisi prius dictum, while not likely
by itself to be the source of a governing principle, was nonetheless consistent with doctrinal treatment
of property extending back at least a half-century; see, e.g., Roach v. Garvan (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683,
683 (Lord Hardwicke ruling that, as a matter of settled practice, substantive judgment regarding
whether legally-recognizable property existed in a work was the province of law not equity). Priestley
then became a “carrier” of the principle without affording a detailed argument regarding its ratio. See
Clyde Croft, Lord Hardwicke’s Use of Precedent in Equity, in LEGAL RECORD AND HISTORICAL
REALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 121, at 134–135 (ed.
Thomas Watkin, Cardiff 1987) (identifying how principles historically emerged from patterns of policy
decisions of the Court without specific precedent, but once established were then be carried along by
future rulings that discretely (however mistakenly) become tagged as ‘authorities’). The weakness of
Priestley as an independent source of precedent was that it was impossible to determine the nature of
the plaintiff’s lost writings - they could have been republican and prospectively seditious (on the basis
of which he had not been prosecuted) or alternatively scientific and of great value. Eyre in effect
declared them to be without demonstrable value as property, implicitly unless or until Priestley could
demonstrate their value at law.
128. Eldon did not clarify if he deduced that from seeing the submitted copy of vol. IV of Pindar’s
octavo WORKS, from his general familiarity with Wolcot’s poems as a member of the often-targeted
government’s inner circle, or from his own knowledge of the exhibition of the Lonsdale information,
having been Solicitor-General at the time. Eldon’s inability (or unwillingness) to declare Wolcot’s titles
as presumptively innocent (sufficient to maintain the injunction) compares interestingly to his
acceptance of the innocence of Lord Byron’s “Beppo” solely on the assurance from plaintiff’s counsel
that it was “perfectly innoxious [and] perfectly inoffensive.” Murray v. Dugdale (1823) (Ch.), reprinted
in THE (LONDON) TIMES, July 23, 1823, no. 11931, p. 3. However, Eldon was clearly aware of
criticisms of his earlier rulings based on Priestley, and in Murray reminded that “the Court ha[s] no
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publication and sale of the octavo edition, giving Wolcot the “liberty to
apply for an injunction, in case [he] succeeds in an action,”129 concluding:
“As to one of these editions, it is not possible to grant the injunction, until
the right of the Plaintiff has been tried in an action. The facts may alter the
effect of the agreement at law; for, if not, the Court ought not to give an
account of the unhallowed profits of libelous publications.”130
Eldon also stated he would dissolve the injunction on publication and
sale of the duodecimo edition, allowing that he would review the nature of
that work if it were presented to the court within a week and “[i]f upon
inspection the work appears innocent, I will act upon that [Walker’s]
submission; if criminal, I will not act at all, and, if doubtful, I will send that
question to law.”131
The distinction is critical, for while Eldon retained the authority to
rule that works brought before him were ‘clearly innocent,’ following
precedent he ruled that works of questionable nature would have to first be
reviewed at law.132 That a work might contain libelous content, at least at
the stage where a plaintiff might ask for an injunction against infringement
on its copyright, was likely more a matter of contextual consideration than
a close reading of text. As a satirist of wide renown, Wolcot had skirted the
borderline of seditious libel since 1785, and come perilously close to
prosecution on several occasions. On the other hand, his caustic treatment

criminal jurisdiction in cases of this nature, and that if the work were really criminal, the publication of
it could not be stopped here, but it must be done in another way,” a principle that “had been settled
without question for a considerable time” and which he could not abandon “till the Legislature should
think it fit to alter the law itself,” id.
129. Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep., at 1.
130. Id. Here Eldon’s language was quite precise—Wolcot was not yet eligible to apply for an
injunction because he had not yet established his property in the contested titles, complicated by the
intimation that the titles contained illicit material and were thus ineligible for protection under common
law.
131. Id. At the time, Eldon was chided for having expressing doubt about and therefore dissolving
an injunction ex mero motu on a text he admittedly had not seen. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, II
COMMENTS ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 936, p. 213, n. 1 (2 vols. 1835-1836) (“there is great
difficulty in adopting this doctrine, denying the protection of an injunction in matters of property upon
mere doubts”); JOHN CAMPBELL, X LIVES OF THE CHANCELLORS 255–256 (10 vols. London: John
Murray, 5th ed. 1868) (“notwithstanding his propensity [as Attorney-General] to prosecute libels, he
had been afraid to bring the author before a jury, and that he now thought it a more convenient course to
unite in his own person the functions of prosecutor and of judge”). The question at that point would
have been whether any party might have been injured by leaving the temporary injunction on
duodecimo edition in place until Eldon had the opportunity to review it, but Wolcot had not complied
with the Court’s order to produce it and Eldon in effect shifted the burden of property back to him.
While we know Wainwright purchased copies of the octavo edition for the purpose of appending it to
Wolcot’s claim, there is no record he also purchased copies of the duodecimo edition.
132. On Eldon’s vacillations regarding questionable material. See Dennis Klinck, Lord Eldon’s
‘Equity’, 20 LEGAL HIST. 51, 52–53 (1999); C.J. Rossiter & Margaret Stone, The Chancellor’s ‘New
Shoe’, 11 U.N.S.W.L.J. 11, 11–16 (1988).
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of the Pitt government or other personages (not to mention the Church of
England) had made his verse titillating, slightly dangerous, and of course
enormously popular. A quick perusal of the contents of the octavo edition
would have confirmed the absence of the purportedly libelous “Epistle to
Lonsdale” obviating that concern, but its mere mention in Wolcot’s
complaint might have given Eldon sufficient cause to direct the whole
matter to law for determination as to whether the author could have
property in the contested pieces published in the octavo set.
Eldon’s reasoning on how the innocence or potentially harmfulness of
their literary content could be determined remains obscure, particularly
since his ruling was quite brief133 and ostensibly procedural.134 Even if it
were not considered definitive regarding the content of the titles, his ruling
was chastised as arbitrary and perhaps even prejudiced, which he publicly
lamented, having hoped through procedural consistency to avoid the
approbation that such decisions varied depending in the predispositions of
the magistrate.135 If he were simply following doctrinal procedure that an
author or publisher of a literary work of questionable content had to first
establish property in that work at law before arguing that he had lost value
in it through infringement and could seek relief at equity, the only
discretion came in whether there was sufficient doubt about the nature of
the work to warrant its direction to law. There a judgment would be
rendered appropriately by a jury, one way or the other.
And unless Eldon directed all literary content brought before him in
copyright claims to law, he could not avoid differentiating the innocent
from the questionable. In Walcot, he expressed doubt regarding the octavo
edition without specification and directed it to law, but dissolved the
injunction in the interim, considering perhaps that the relative cost to the
133. The authoritative (and only) nominate report on Walcot v. Walker has been reproduced from
FRANCIS VESEY, SAMUEL BARKER, ET AL. REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH
COURT OF CHANCERY FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1817, at 1 (London: Brooke, 1827), which footnoted
Eldon’s reference to Eyre as referencing Dr. Priestley’s Case and Murray v. Dugdale. Vesey also
referenced Hogg v. Kirby, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (Ch.), in which Eldon was conflicted on
maintaining an injunction on a work containing a false assertion in its title (its author being fictitious)
but—unlike in Walcot—did so temporarily while directing the plaintiff to law to sort out property rights
with due speed, after which he would consider a motion to dissolve the injunction. Hogg, 32 Eng. Rep.,
at 340.
134. That Eldon saw Wolcot’s claim as requiring only a procedural ruling may be evidenced by his
not even mentioning the case in his JUDICIAL NOTEBOOKS 1802–1821 (Special Collections,
Georgetown Law Library), which consistently included quite detailed factual notations regarding
virtually every substantive case Eldon heard at equity between 1802 and 1813. The case he did note the
week prior to the hearing on Walcot was O’Connor v. Cook, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1247, 1252 which he
likewise directed to law. See II JUDICIAL NOTEBOOKS, 214b-220 (11 vols.) (“Where there is a
reasonable doubt before you → [arrow] to the prejudices of a jury and to a judge of a jury.”).
135. See Gee v. Pritchard (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 674, 679 (Ch) (Eldon acknowledging his desire to
avoid Selden’s “reproach that equity . . . varies like the Chancellor’s foot”).
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integrity of the Chancery court was higher than incremental lost profits in
the delay. Interestingly, he was criticized less severely for that judgment,
based on his cursory review of the text, than for his dissolution of the
injunction on the duodecimo edition, which he had not seen at all.
To dismiss Eldon’s ruling in Walcot as quaintly arcane would be a
mistake. First of all, it is arguably the doctrinal root source of both common
law precedent regarding content exceptionalism in copyright and the
echoes we hear in recent swarm cases. While Eldon’s subsequent rulings
provided amplification and nuance, they were all consistent with Walcot in
both ratio and resolution. Furthermore, Walcot frames our consideration of
the fundamental issues raised regarding whether copyrighted works of
libelous content—seditious, blasphemous, or obscene—could be eligible
for equitable relief, portrayed in recent echoes as still an ‘open question.’ In
this, Eldon could not avoid some level of discretion but largely deferred
final judgment to law or the legislature. Finally, Walcot reinforces that, in
the absence of strict legislative guidance regarding content exceptions and
consistent with established constitutionally protected rights of expression,
any judgment of a copyrighted work’s criminality of content in cases where
there might be some doubt remained the province of a jury. As indicated by
Mitchell Bros., such a judgment must precede any challenge to a registered
work’s eligibility for protection from infringement.
There is of course the question of whether the harmful consequences
of denying copyright protection to questionable works might be sufficiently
grave and immediate to warrant discretionary action by the court in
refusing equitable relief. Such a denial would be an open invitation to
piracy and further proliferation of the questionable works, as Eldon
himself addressed in Southey, lamenting the obvious tradeoff but ultimately
regarding it the duty of the legislature to make such judgments.136 That
Congress has not adopted content-excepting language to prevent such
harms therefore remains compelling, as acknowledged by Mitchell Bros.,
even though statutory adoption of content discriminatory language may still
be within Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause if standards
could be fashioned consistent with First Amendment protections.137
VI.

FALSE ECHOES

The echoes of content exceptionalism in recent swarm cases reflect all
these issues, however faintly and perhaps even unknowingly. However,
136.
137.

See Southey v. Sherwood (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008 (Ch).
See generally Snow, supra note 59.
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with the possible exception of Devils Films, they all either adhered to the
Eldonian conclusion that such judgments are the province of juries rather
than court declaration or sought safe ground in noting it to be an ‘open
question.’ It is here that Eldon’s ruling in Walcot seems to have been
misinterpreted. Eldon did not declare Wolcot’s verse libelous and therefore
ineligible for injunctive relief. Instead, he ruled that libelous nature of
Wolcot’s verse, admitted in his own bill of complaint, was ambiguous—not
clearly innocent and yet not clearly criminal—and could only be
determined by a jury.
That Wolcot’s works might have fallen into the ‘doubtful’ category
was no great surprise, given his admitted libel in the non-contested title and
his reputation as an author whose works were consistently under scrutiny
for seditious libel. Eldon’s deferral of the contested titles to law would then
have been a reasonable contextual judgment rather than the product of his
own close reading of the text, and he thereby left the door ajar for equitable
relief should Wolcot’s property in them be accepted in an action. That
several other plaintiffs directed to law in a similar manner did not return to
Chancery left the impression that such a deferral was a death knell, a signal
that the works were probably ineligible.138 This if nothing else may have
caused the misreading of Eldon’s ruling.
The recent faint echoes of content exceptionalism therefore tend to
ring false. The sporadic claim that the rulings within or between districts
exhibit disagreement over content neutrality under Mitchell Bros. is simply
without substantiation. In fact, excepting Devils Films, all subsequent
rulings have been substantively consistent with the argument and ruling in
Mitchell Bros., even while some in the same breath repeat the axiom that
content neutrality ‘remains open question.’ Moreover, even the common
law notion of content exceptionalism, presumably the source of the echoes
we hear, lacks clear doctrinal roots. If traced back to its original explication
in Walcot v. Walker, we discover it is not based on Eldon’s ruling or its
underlying ratio but instead is sourced in its perceived consequence of
having effectively branded as criminal any questionable (or objectionable)
content in contested titles. That Eldon’s rulings in Walcot and subsequent
cases were based on his discretionary judgment that the titles were intended
to harm the public and therefore were ineligible for copyright protection is
not borne out in the case history. Similarly, in none of the recent swarm
cases, including the often-cited Devils Films, was a copyright claim
138. Each case not pursued to law, or successfully pleaded at law but not brought back to equity,
had its own unique circumstances that made pursuit contrary to the interests of the plaintiff. See
Alexander, supra note 5, at 259–275.
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declared ineligible for relief based on substantive review of its content by
court declaration (as ‘obscene’), by its general categorization (such as
pornography, or ‘hard-core), or by a jury.139
This review of recent swarm cases reveals faint and intermittent
echoes of the common law notion of content exceptionalism, that the
acceptance of the principle of content neutrality in copyright is still in fact
an open question, and courts may be justified in denying copyright
protections to duly registered properties as a matter of public policy
discretion. This seems to but does not quite contradict the content neutrality
principle in Mitchell Bros., and might be considered even more timid than
that, to point of being misleading. None of these rulings makes any attempt
to provide a ratio for content exceptionalism but instead they collectively,
each by citing the others, appear to embrace a legal argument they assumed
had been governing since the notion of content exceptionalism was first
enunciated in copyright in Walcot v. Walker. However, a closer reading of
Walcot reveals the ruling was largely procedural rather than substantive
and supportive of content discrimination, and it neither initiated nor
established the notion of content exceptionalism. At best, an argument for
content exceptionalism has always drawn its strength not from court
doctrine but rather from the anticipated negative consequences of applying
content neutrality in copyright, expressed even more strenuously in the
1820s than today. Whether the court might or should supplant legislative
prerogative was never a serious consideration, then or now.

139. See Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2012) (“the prevailing view is that
even illegality is not a bar to copyrightability.”).

